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⁽¹⁾ Text with EEA relevance.

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

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II

(Non-legislative acts)

REGULATIONS

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/757

of 13 May 2019

implementing Article 17(3) of Regulation (EU) No 224/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Central African Republic

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 224/2014 of 10 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Central African Republic ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 17(3) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 10 March 2014, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 224/2014.
- (2) On 18 April 2019, the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) updated the information relating to one person subject to restrictive measures.
- (3) Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 224/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 224/2014 is hereby amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

*Article 2*This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 May 2019.

*For the Council**The President*

F. MOGHERINI

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 70, 11.3.2014, p. 1.

ANNEX

In Regulation (EU) No 224/2014, Annex I, Part A (Persons), the entry for the person listed below is replaced by the following entry:

- ‘12. **Abdoulaye HISSÈNE** (*alias*: a) **Abdoulaye Issène**; b) **Abdoulaye Hissein**; c) **Hissene Abdoulaye**; d) **Abdoulaye Issène Ramadan**; e) **Abdoulaye Issene Ramadan**; f) **Issene Abdoulaye**)

Date of birth: a) 1967; b) 1 January 1967

Place of birth: a) Ndele, Bamingui-Bangoran, Central African Republic; b) Haraze Manguéigne, Chad

Nationality: a) Central African Republic; b) Chad

Passport No: CAR diplomatic passport No D00000897, issued on 5 April 2013 (valid until 4 April 2018)

National identification no: Chad national identity card no. 103-00653129-22, issued on 21 April 2009 (expires on 21 April 2019)

Address: a) KM5, Bangui, Central African Republic; b) Nana-Grebizi, Central African Republic; c) Ndjari, Ndjamena, Chad

Date of UN designation: 17 May 2017

Other Information: Hissène was formerly the Minister of Youth and Sports as part of the Cabinet for the Central African Republic's former President Michel Djotodia. Prior to that, he was the head of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace, a political party. He also established himself as a leader of armed militias in Bangui, in particular in the “PK5” (3rd district) neighbourhood. Father's name is Abdoulaye. Mother's name is Absita Moussa. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6098910>

Information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdoulaye Hissène was listed on 17 May 2017 pursuant to paragraphs 16 and 17(g) of resolution 2339 (2017) as “engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, including acts that threaten or impede the political transition process, or the stabilisation and reconciliation process or that fuel violence;” and “involved in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against UN missions or international security presences, including MINUSCA, the European Union Missions and French operations which support them.”

Additional information:

Abdoulaye Hissène and other members of the ex-Séléka collaborated with anti-balaka spoilers allied with former Central African Republic (CAR) President François Bozizé, including Maxime Mokom, to encourage violent protests and clashes in September 2015 as part of a failed coup attempt to bring down the Government while then-Transitional President Catherine Samba-Panza was attending the 2015 UN General Assembly. Mokom, Hissène, and others were indicted by the CAR government for various criminal offenses, including murder, arson, torture, and looting, stemming from the failed coup.

Since 2015, Hissène had become one of the main leaders of armed militias located in the “PK5” neighbourhood of Bangui which comprised more than 100 men. As such, he prevented the freedom of movement and the return of state authority in the area, including through illegal taxation of transportation and commercial activities. In the second half of 2015, Hissène acted as the representative of the ex-Séléka “Nairobists” in Bangui operating in a rapprochement with anti-balaka fighters under Mokom. Armed men under the control of Haroun Gaye and Hissène participated in the violent events which took place in Bangui between 26 September and 3 October 2015.

Members of Hissène's group are suspected of having been involved in an attack on the 13 December 2015 — the day of the constitutional referendum — on the vehicle of Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane, a leader of the ex-Séléka. Hissène is accused of orchestrating violence in Bangui's KM5 district that killed five, wounded twenty, and prevented residents from voting in the constitutional referendum. Hissène put the elections at risk by creating a cycle of retaliatory attacks between different groups.

On 15 March 2016, Hissène was apprehended by the police at Bangui M'poko airport and transferred to the research and investigation section of the national gendarmerie. His militia subsequently released him, using force, and stole one weapon previously handed over by MINUSCA as part of an exemption request approved by the Committee.

On 19 June 2016, following the arrest of Muslim traders by internal security forces at "PK 12", militias of Gaye and Hissène kidnapped five national policemen in Bangui. On 20 June, MINUSCA attempted to release the policemen. Armed men under the control of Hissène and Gaye exchanged fire with the peacekeepers attempting to release the hostages. As a result, at least six individuals were killed and one peacekeeper was injured.

On 12 August 2016, Hissène took the lead of a 6-vehicle convoy with heavily armed individuals. The convoy, which was fleeing Bangui, was intercepted by MINUSCA south of Sibut. En route to the North, the convoy exchanged fire with internal security forces at several checkpoints. The convoy was eventually stopped by MINUSCA 40 km south of Sibut. After multiple gunfights, MINUSCA captured 11 of the men, but Hissène and several others escaped. Individuals arrested indicated to MINUSCA that Hissène was the leader of the convoy whose objective was to reach Bria and participate in the Assembly of ex-Séléka groups organised by Nourredine Adam.

In August and September 2016, the Panel of Experts travelled twice to Sibut in order to inspect the belongings of the convoy of Hissène, Gaye and Hamit Tidjani, seized by MINUSCA on 13 August. The Panel also inspected the ammunition seized in the house of Hissène on 16 August. Lethal and non-lethal military equipment was recovered in the six vehicles and from the apprehended individuals. On 16 August 2016, the Central Gendarmerie raided the home of Hissène in Bangui. More than 700 weapons were found.

On 4 September 2016, a group of ex-Séléka elements coming from Kaga-Bandoro on six motor-bikes to pick up Hissène and his affiliates opened fire against MINUSCA next to Dékoa. During this incident, one ex-Séléka fighter was killed, and two peacekeepers and one civilian were wounded.'

COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2019/758**of 31 January 2019****supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for the minimum action and the type of additional measures credit and financial institutions must take to mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risk in certain third countries****(Text with EEA relevance)**

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 45(7) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) Credit institutions and financial institutions are required to identify, assess and manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risk to which they are exposed, particularly when they have established branches or majority-owned subsidiaries in third countries or because they are considering whether to establish branches or majority-owned subsidiaries in third countries. Directive (EU) 2015/849 therefore sets standards for the effective assessment and management of money laundering and terrorist financing risk at group level.
- (2) The consistent implementation of group-wide anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policies and procedures is key to the robust and effective management of money laundering and terrorist financing risk within the group.
- (3) There are, however, circumstances where a group operates branches or majority-owned subsidiaries in a third country whose law does not permit the implementation of group-wide anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policies and procedures. This can be the case, for example, where the third country's data protection or banking secrecy law limits the group's ability to access, process or exchange information related to customers of branches or majority-owned subsidiaries in the third country.
- (4) In those circumstances, and in situations where the ability of competent authorities effectively to supervise the group's compliance with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2015/849 is impeded because competent authorities do not have access to relevant information held at branches or majority-owned subsidiaries in third countries, additional policies and procedures are required to manage money laundering and terrorist financing risk effectively. These additional policies and procedures may include obtaining consent from customers, which can serve to overcome certain legal obstacles to the implementation of group-wide anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policies and procedures in third countries where other options are limited.
- (5) The need to ensure a consistent, Union level response to legal obstacles to the implementation of group-wide policies and procedures justifies the imposition of specific, minimum actions credit and financial institutions should be required to take in those situations. However, such additional policies and procedures should be risk-based.
- (6) Credit institutions and financial institutions should be able to demonstrate to their competent authority that the extent of additional measures they have taken is appropriate in view of the money laundering and terrorist financing risk. However, should the competent authority consider that the additional measures a credit institution or financial institution has taken are insufficient to manage that risk, the competent authority should be able to

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73.

direct the credit institution or financial institution to take specific measures to ensure the credit institution's or financial institution's compliance with its anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism obligations.

- (7) Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁽²⁾, Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁽³⁾ and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁽⁴⁾ empower the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), respectively, to issue joint guidelines to ensure the common, uniform and consistent application of Union law. When complying with this Regulation credit institutions and financial institutions should take into account the joint guidelines issued in accordance with Article 17 and Article 18(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 on simplified and enhanced customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with individual business relationships and occasional transactions and make every effort to comply with those guidelines.
- (8) The provisions of this Regulation should be without prejudice to the duty of competent authorities of the home Member State to exercise additional supervisory actions as stipulated in Article 45(5) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 in cases where the application of additional measures defined by this Regulation will prove insufficient.
- (9) The provisions of this Regulation should also be without prejudice to the enhanced due diligence measures credit institutions and financial institutions are required/obliged to take when dealing with natural persons or legal entities established in countries identified by the Commission as high risk pursuant to Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849.
- (10) Credit institutions and financial institutions should be given sufficient time to adjust their policies and procedures in line with this Regulation's requirements. To this end, it is appropriate that the application of this Regulation be deferred by three months from the date on which it enters into force.
- (11) This Regulation is based on draft regulatory technical standards developed by the European Supervisory Authorities (the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority), submitted to the Commission.
- (12) The European Supervisory Authorities have conducted open public consultations on the draft regulatory technical standards on which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits and requested the opinion of the Banking Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Subject matter and scope

This Regulation lays down a set of additional measures, including minimum action, that credit institutions and financial institutions must take to effectively handle the money laundering and terrorist financing risk where a third country's law does not permit the implementation of group-wide policies and procedures as referred to in Article 45(1) and (3) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 at the level of branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are part of the group and established in the third country.

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).

⁽³⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48).

⁽⁴⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84).

*Article 2***General obligations for each third country**

For each third country where they have established a branch or they are a majority owner of a subsidiary, credit institutions and financial institutions shall at least:

- (a) assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risk to their group, record that assessment, keep it up to date and retain it in order to be able to share it with their competent authority;
- (b) ensure that the risk referred to in point (a) is reflected appropriately in their group-wide anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policies and procedures;
- (c) obtain senior management approval at group-level for the risk assessment referred to in point (a) and for the group-wide anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policies and procedures referred to in point (b);
- (d) provide targeted training to relevant staff members in the third country to enable them to identify money laundering and terrorist financing risk indicators, and ensure that the training is effective.

*Article 3***Individual risk assessments**

1. Where the third country's law prohibits or restricts the application of policies and procedures that are necessary to identify and assess adequately the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with a business relationship or occasional transaction due to restrictions on access to relevant customer and beneficial ownership information or restrictions on the use of such information for customer due diligence purposes, credit institutions or financial institutions shall at least:

- (a) inform the competent authority of the home Member State without undue delay and in any case no later than 28 calendar days after identifying the third country of the following:
 - (i) the name of the third country concerned;
 - (ii) how the implementation of the third country's law prohibits or restricts the application of policies and procedures that are necessary to identify and assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with a customer;
- (b) ensure that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country determine whether consent from their customers and, where applicable, their customers' beneficial owners, can be used to legally overcome restrictions or prohibitions referred to in point (a)(ii);
- (c) ensure that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country require their customers and, where applicable, their customers' beneficial owners, to give consent to overcome restrictions or prohibitions referred to in point (a)(ii) to the extent that this is compatible with the third country's law.

2. Where the consent referred to in point (c) of paragraph 1 is not feasible, credit institutions and financial institutions shall take additional measures as well as their standard anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures, to manage the money laundering and terrorist financing.

Those additional measures shall include the additional measure set out in point (c) of Article 8 and one or more of the measures set out in points (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) of that Article.

Where a credit institution or financial institution cannot effectively manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risk by applying the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, it shall:

- (a) ensure that the branch or majority-owned subsidiary terminates the business relationship;

- (b) ensure that the branch or majority-owned subsidiary not carry out the occasional transaction;
 - (c) close down some or all of the operations provided by their branch and majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country.
3. Credit institutions and financial institutions shall determine the extent of the additional measures referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 on a risk-sensitive basis and be able to demonstrate to their competent authority that the extent of additional measures is appropriate in view of the money laundering and terrorist financing risk.

Article 4

Customer data sharing and processing

1. Where a third country's law prohibits or restricts the sharing or processing of customer data for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism purposes within the group, credit institutions and financial institution shall at least:

- (a) inform the competent authority of the home Member State without undue delay and in any case no later than 28 days after identifying the third country of the following:
 - (i) the name of the third country concerned;
 - (ii) how the implementation of the third country's law prohibits or restricts the sharing or processing of customer data for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism purposes;
- (b) ensure that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country determine whether consent from their customers and, where applicable, their customers' beneficial owners, can be used to legally overcome restrictions or prohibitions referred to in point (a)(ii);
- (c) ensure that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country require their customers and, where applicable, their customers' beneficial owners, to provide consent to overcome restrictions or prohibitions referred to in point (a)(ii) to the extent that this is compatible with the third country's law.

2. In cases where consent referred to in point (c) of paragraph 1 is not feasible, credit institutions and financial institutions shall take additional measures as well as their standard anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures to manage risk. These additional measures shall include the additional measure set out in point (a) of Article 8 or the additional measure set out in point (c) of that Article. Where the money laundering and terrorist financing risk is sufficient to require further additional measures, credit and financial institutions shall apply one or more of the remaining additional measures set out in points (a) to (c) of Article 8.

3. Where a credit institution or financial institution cannot effectively manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risk by applying the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, it shall close down some or all of the operations provided by their branch and majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country.

4. Credit institutions and financial institutions shall determine the extent of the additional measures referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 on a risk-sensitive basis and be able to demonstrate to their competent authority that the extent of additional measures is appropriate in view of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Article 5

Disclosure of information related to suspicious transactions

1. Where the third country's law prohibits or restricts the sharing of information referred to in Article 33(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 by branches and majority-owned subsidiaries established in the third country with other entities in their group, credit institutions and financial institutions shall at least:

- (a) inform the competent authority of the home Member State without undue delay and in any case no later than 28 days after identifying the third country of the following:
 - (i) the name of the third country concerned;
 - (ii) how the implementation of the third country's law prohibits or restricts the sharing or processing of the content of information referred to in Article 33(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 identified by a branch and majority-owned subsidiary established in a third country with other entities in their group;

(b) require the branch or majority-owned subsidiary to provide relevant information to the credit institution's or financial institution's senior management so that it is able to assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the operation of such a branch or majority-owned subsidiary and the impact this has on the group, such as:

- (i) the number of suspicious transactions reported within a set period;
- (ii) aggregated statistical data providing an overview of the circumstances that gave rise to suspicion.

2. Credit institutions and financial institutions shall take additional measures as well as their standard anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures and the measures referred to in paragraph 1 to manage risk.

Those additional measures shall include one or more of the additional measures set out in points (a) to (c) and (g) to (i) of Article 8.

3. Where credit institutions and financial institutions cannot effectively manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risk by applying the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, they shall close down some or all of the operations provided by their branch and majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country.

4. Credit institutions and financial institutions shall determine the extent of the additional measures referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 on a risk-sensitive basis and be able to demonstrate to their competent authority that the extent of additional measures is appropriate in view of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Article 6

Transfer of customer data to Member States

Where the third country's law prohibits or restricts the transfer of data related to customers of a branch and majority-owned subsidiary established in a third country to a Member State for the purpose of supervision for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, credit institutions and financial institutions shall at least:

- (a) inform the competent authority of the home Member State without undue delay and in any case no later than 28 calendar days after identifying the third country of the following:
 - (i) the name of the third country concerned;
 - (ii) how the implementation of the third country's law prohibits or restricts the transfer of data related to customers for the purpose of supervision for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism;
- (b) carry out enhanced reviews, including, where this is commensurate with the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the operation of the branch or majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country, onsite checks or independent audits, to be satisfied that the branch or majority-owned subsidiary effectively implements group-wide policies and procedures and that it adequately identifies, assesses and manages the money laundering and terrorist financing risks;
- (c) provide the findings of the reviews referred to in point (b) to the competent authority of the home Member State upon request;
- (d) require the branch or majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country regularly to provide relevant information to the credit institution's or financial institution's senior management, including at least the following:
 - (i) the number of high risk customers and aggregated statistical data providing an overview of the reasons why customers have been classified as high risk, such as politically exposed person status;
 - (ii) the number of suspicious transactions identified and reported and aggregated statistical data providing an overview of the circumstances that gave rise to suspicion;
- (e) make the information referred to in point (d) available to the competent authority of the home Member State upon request.

*Article 7***Record-keeping**

1. Where the third country's law prohibits or restricts the application of record-keeping measures equivalent to those specified in Chapter V of Directive (EU) 2015/849, credit institutions and financial institutions shall at least:

- (a) inform the competent authority of the home Member State without undue delay and in any case no later than 28 days after identifying the third country of the following:
 - (i) the name of the third country concerned;
 - (ii) how the implementation of the third country's law prohibits or restricts the application of record-keeping measures equivalent to those laid down in Directive (EU) 2015/849;
- (b) establish whether consent from the customer and, where applicable, their beneficial owner, can be used to legally overcome restrictions or prohibitions referred to in point (a)(ii);
- (c) ensure that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country require customers and, where applicable, their customers' beneficial owners, to provide consent to overcome restrictions or prohibitions referred to in point (a)(ii) to the extent that this is compatible with the third country's law.

2. In cases where consent referred to in point (c) of paragraph 1 is not feasible, credit institutions and financial institutions shall take additional measures as well as their standard anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures and the measures referred to in paragraph 1 to manage risk. These additional measures shall include one or more of the additional measures set out in points (a) to (c) and (j) of Article 8.

3. Credit and financial institutions shall determine the extent of the additional measures referred to in paragraph 2 on a risk-sensitive basis and be able to demonstrate to their competent authority that the extent of additional measures is appropriate in view of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.

*Article 8***Additional measures**

Credit institutions and financial institutions shall take the following additional measures pursuant to Article 3(2), Article 4(2), Article 5(2) and Article 7(2) respectively:

- (a) ensuring that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country restrict the nature and type of financial products and services provided by the branch of majority-owned subsidiary in the third country to those that present a low money laundering and terrorist financing risk and have a low impact on the group's risk exposure;
- (b) ensuring that other entities of the same group do not rely on customer due diligence measures carried out by a branch or majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country, but instead carry out customer due diligence on any customer of a branch or majority-owned subsidiary established in third country who wishes to be provided with products or services by those other entities of the same group even if the conditions in Article 28 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 are met;
- (c) carrying out enhanced reviews, including, where this is commensurate with the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the operation of the branch or majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country, onsite checks or independent audits, to be satisfied that the branch or majority-owned subsidiary effectively identifies, assesses and manages the money laundering and terrorist financing risks;
- (d) ensuring that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country seek the approval of the credit institution's or financial institution's senior management for the establishment and maintenance of higher-risk business relationships, or for carrying out a higher risk occasional transaction;
- (e) ensuring that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country determine the source and, where applicable, the destination of funds to be used in the business relationship or occasional transaction;

- (f) ensuring that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country carry out enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship including enhanced transaction monitoring, until the branches or majority-owned subsidiaries are reasonably satisfied that they understand the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with the business relationship;
- (g) ensuring that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country share with the credit institution or financial institution underlying suspicious transaction report information that gave rise to the knowledge, suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering and terrorist financing was being attempted or had occurred, such as facts, transactions, circumstances and documents upon which suspicions are based, including personal information to the extent that this is possible under the third country's law;
- (h) carrying out enhanced ongoing monitoring on any customer and, where applicable, beneficial owner of a customer of a branch or majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country who is known to have been the subject of suspicious transaction reports by other entities of the same group;
- (i) ensuring that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country has effective systems and controls in place to identify and report suspicious transactions;
- (j) ensuring that their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries that are established in the third country keep the risk profile and due diligence information related to a customer of a branch or majority-owned subsidiary established in the third country up to date and secure as long as legally possible, and in any case for at least the duration of the business relationship.

Article 9

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

It shall apply from 3 September 2019.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 31 January 2019.

For the Commission
The President
Jean-Claude JUNCKER

COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) 2019/759**of 13 May 2019****laying down transitional measures for the application of public health requirements of imports of food containing both products of plant origin and processed products of animal origin (composite products)****(Text with EEA relevance)**

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin ⁽¹⁾, and in particular the first paragraph of Article 9 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 provides for significant changes to the public health (food safety) rules and procedures to be complied with by food business operators. In particular, it lays down certain conditions for imports of food containing both products of plant origin and processed products of animal origin (composite products) into the Union.
- (2) Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/185 ⁽²⁾ provides for transitional measures derogating from these rules for food business operators importing food containing both products of plant origin and processed products of animal origin (composite products), others than those referred to in Article 3(1) and (3) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 28/2012 ⁽³⁾, for which the public health conditions for importing into the Union have not yet been laid down at Union level. This derogation applies until 31 December 2020.
- (3) Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council ('Animal Health Law') ⁽⁴⁾ lays down rules for the prevention and control of animal diseases which are transmissible to animals or to humans. It applies to products of animal origin, and therefore to composite products as defined in Article 2(a) of Commission Decision 2007/275/EC ⁽⁵⁾. Once applicable, the Regulation will set out requirements for the entry into the Union of animals, germinal products and products of animal origin from third countries and territories. This Regulation shall apply from 21 April 2021.
- (4) In order to ensure legal clarity and consistency and to facilitate operators and competent authorities' transition to the new rules, it is necessary to have a single date of application for the new import conditions for composite products covered by Article 6(4) of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004. The end of these transitional measures should therefore be extended to 20 April 2021.
- (5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

*Article 1***Subject matter**

This Regulation lays down transitional measures for the application of certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 for a transitional period from 1 January 2021 to 20 April 2021.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 55.

⁽²⁾ Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/185 of 2 February 2017 laying down transitional measures for the application of certain provisions of Regulations (EC) No 853/2004 and (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 29, 3.2.2017, p. 21).

⁽³⁾ Commission Regulation (EU) No 28/2012 of 11 January 2012 laying down requirements for the certification for imports into and transit through the Union of certain composite products and amending Decision 2007/275/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1162/2009 (OJ L 12, 14.1.2012, p. 1).

⁽⁴⁾ Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health ('Animal Health Law') (OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, p. 1).

⁽⁵⁾ Commission Decision 2007/275/EC of 17 April 2007 concerning lists of animals and products to be subject to controls at border inspection posts under Directive 91/496/EEC and 97/78/EC (OJ L 116, 4.5.2007, p. 9).

*Article 2***Definitions**

For the purpose of this Regulation, 'composite product' means composite product as defined in Article 2(a) of Decision 2007/275/EC.

*Article 3***Derogation concerning public health requirements of imports of food containing both products of plant origin and processed products of animal origin**

By way of derogation from Article 6(4) of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, food business operators importing food containing both products of plant origin and processed products of animal origin, others than those referred to in Article 3(1) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 28/2012 shall be exempt from the requirements referred to in Article 6(4) of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.

Imports of such products shall comply with the public health import requirements of the Member State of import.

*Article 4***Entry into force and application**

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

It shall apply from 1 January 2021 to 20 April 2021.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 May 2019.

For the Commission
The President
Jean-Claude JUNCKER

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/760**of 13 May 2019****authorising the placing on the market of *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass as a novel food under Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470****(Text with EEA relevance)**

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on novel foods, amending Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 258/97 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1852/2001 ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 12 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 provides that only novel foods authorised and included in the Union list may be placed on the market within the Union.
- (2) Pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2283, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470 ⁽²⁾ establishing a Union list of authorised novel foods was adopted.
- (3) Pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2283, the Commission is to submit a draft implementing act authorising placing on the Union market of a novel food and on the updating of the Union list.
- (4) On 10 April 2017, the company Skotan S.A. ('the Applicant') made a request in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁽³⁾ to the competent authority of Poland to place *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass on the Union market as a novel food within the meaning of point (d) of Article 1(2) of that Regulation. The application requested for *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass to be used in food supplements. The maximum use levels proposed by the applicant are 3 g per day for children from 3 to 9 years of age, and 6 g per day thereafter.
- (5) On 15 November 2017, the competent authority of Poland issued its initial assessment report. In that report, it came to the conclusion that *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass meets the criteria for novel foods set out in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 258/97.
- (6) Pursuant to Article 35(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2283, any request for placing a novel food on the market within the Union submitted to a Member State in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 258/97 and for which the final decision has not been taken before 1 January 2018 shall be treated as an application submitted under Regulation (EU) 2015/2283.
- (7) While the request for placing *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass on the Union market as a novel food was submitted to a Member State in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 258/97, the application also meets the requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) 2015/2283.
- (8) In accordance with Article 10(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2283, the Commission consulted the European Food Safety Authority ('Authority') on 22 June 2018, asking it to provide a scientific opinion by carrying out an assessment for *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass as a novel food.
- (9) On 17 January 2019, the Authority adopted the 'Scientific Opinion on the safety of *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass as a novel food pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2015/2283' ⁽⁴⁾. That opinion is in line with the requirements of Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2283.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 327, 11.12.2015, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470 of 20 December 2017 establishing the Union list of novel foods in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council on novel foods (OJ L 351, 30.12.2017, p. 72).

⁽³⁾ Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of 27 January 1997 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients (OJ L 43, 14.2.1997, p. 1).

⁽⁴⁾ EFSA Journal 2019;17(2):5594.

- (10) The opinion of the Authority gives sufficient grounds to establish that *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass in the proposed use and use levels, when used in food supplements, complies with Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2283.
- (11) Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁽⁵⁾ lays down requirements on food supplements. The use of *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass should be authorised without prejudice to the requirements of that Directive.
- (12) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

- 1. *Yarrowia lipolytica* yeast biomass as specified in the Annex to this Regulation shall be included in the Union list of authorised novel foods established in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470.
- 2. The entry in the Union list referred to in paragraph 1 shall include the conditions of use and labelling requirements laid down in the Annex to this Regulation.
- 3. The authorisation provided for in this Article shall be without prejudice to the provisions of Directive 2002/46/EC.

Article 2

The Annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in *the Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 May 2019.

For the Commission
The President
Jean-Claude JUNCKER

⁽⁵⁾ Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements (OJ L 183, 12.7.2002, p. 51).

The Annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470 is amended as follows:

(1) The following entry is inserted in Table 1 (Authorised novel foods) in alphabetical order:

'Authorised novel food	Conditions under which the novel food may be used		Additional specific labelling requirements	Other requirements
<i>Yarrowia lipolytica</i> yeast biomass	Specified food category	Maximum levels	The designation of the novel food on the labelling of the foodstuffs containing it shall be “ <i>Yarrowia lipolytica</i> yeast heat-killed biomass”	
	Food Supplements as defined in Directive 2002/46/EC, excluding food supplements for infants and young children	6 g/day for children from 10 years of age, adolescents and general adult population 3 g/day for children from 3 to 9 years of age		

(2) The following entry is inserted in Table 2 (Specifications) in alphabetical order:

'Authorised Novel Food	Specification
<i>Yarrowia lipolytica</i> yeast biomass	Description/Definition: The novel food is the dried and heat-killed biomass of the yeast <i>Yarrowia lipolytica</i>. Characteristics/Composition: Protein : 45-55 g/100 g Dietary fibre: 24-30 g/100 g Sugars: < 1,0 g/100 g Fat: 7-10 g/100 g Total ash: ≤ 12 % Water content: ≤ 5 % Dry matter content: ≥ 95 % Microbiological criteria: Total Aerobic Microbial Count: ≤ 5 × 10³ CFU/g Total Yeast and Mould Count: ≤ 10² CFU/g Viable <i>Yarrowia lipolytica</i> cells ⁽¹⁾: < 10 CFU/g (i.e. limit of detection) Coliforms: ≤ 10 CFU/g <i>Salmonella</i> spp.: Absence in 25 g

⁽¹⁾ To be tested immediately after the heat-treatment step. Measures have to be in place to prevent cross-contamination with viable *Yarrowia lipolytica* cells during packaging and/or storage of the NF

DECISIONS

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2019/761

of 13 May 2019

amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 42(4) and 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 22 July 2014 the Council adopted Decision 2014/486/CFSP ⁽¹⁾ on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine).
- (2) On 20 November 2017 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/2161 ⁽²⁾, extending the mandate of EUAM Ukraine until 31 May 2019 and providing a financial reference amount for the same period. On 18 December 2017 that reference amount was increased by means of Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2371 ⁽³⁾.
- (3) On 5 March 2019, following a strategic review of EUAM Ukraine, the Political and Security Committee recommended that EUAM Ukraine be extended until 31 May 2021.
- (4) Decision 2014/486/CFSP should therefore be extended until 31 May 2021.
- (5) EUAM Ukraine will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2014/486/CFSP is amended as follows:

- (1) in Article 14(1), the following subparagraph is added:

‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUAM Ukraine for the period from 1 June 2019 to 31 May 2021 shall be EUR 54 138 700.’;

- (2) in Article 19, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘It shall apply until 31 May 2021.’.

⁽¹⁾ Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 42).

⁽²⁾ Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2161 of 20 November 2017 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (OJ L 304, 21.11.2017, p. 48).

⁽³⁾ Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2371 of 18 December 2017 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (OJ L 337, 19.12.2017, p. 34).

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 13 May 2019.

For the Council
The President
F. MOGHERINI

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2019/762**of 13 May 2019****amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 42(4) and 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 15 April 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/219/CFSP ⁽¹⁾ on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali).
- (2) On 21 February 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/312 ⁽²⁾ extending EUCAP Sahel Mali and providing it with a financial reference amount until 14 January 2021.
- (3) On 25 June 2018, in its conclusions on Sahel/Mali, the Council underlined the importance of the regionalisation of CSDP in the Sahel with the aim of strengthening, as appropriate, the civilian and military support to cross-border cooperation, the regional cooperation structures, in particular those of the G5 Sahel, and the capacity and ownership of the G5 countries to address the security challenges in the region.
- (4) On 15 February 2019, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania welcomed the envisaged deployment of EUCAP Sahel Mali in support of the G5 Sahel and of Mauritania's national capabilities.
- (5) On 18 February 2019, the Council approved a joint civil-military Concept of Operations on Regionalisation of CSDP action in the Sahel.
- (6) Decision 2014/219/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly.
- (7) EUCAP Sahel Mali will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2014/219/CFSP is amended as follows:

- (1) in Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

‘3. EUCAP Sahel Mali shall contribute, without prejudice to its core mandate in Mali, to the regionalisation of CSDP action in the Sahel by contributing to the improvement of interoperability and coordination between the internal security forces of G5 Sahel countries, as well as by supporting cross-border cooperation, supporting regional cooperation structures and contributing to the improvement of the national capabilities of G5 Sahel countries. EUCAP Sahel Mali may carry out those activities in the G5 Sahel countries. For that purpose, EUCAP Sahel Mali shall provide training, advice and other specific support to G5 Sahel countries, within its means and capabilities, upon request from the country concerned and taking into account the security situation.

⁽¹⁾ Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) (OJ L 113, 16.4.2014, p. 21).

⁽²⁾ Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/312 of 21 February 2019 amending and extending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) (OJ L 51, 22.2.2019, p. 29).

4. To achieve its objective, EUCAP Sahel Mali shall operate in accordance with the strategic lines of operation defined in the Crisis Management Concept approved by the Council on 17 March 2014 and set out in the operational planning documents approved by the Council, including the joint civil-military Concept of Operations on Regionalisation of CSDP action in the Sahel. Before the launching of a new activity in a new G5 Sahel country, the Political and Security Committee shall be informed thereof.;

(2) in Article 14(1), the following subparagraph is added:

‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUCAP Sahel Mali between 1 March 2019 and 14 January 2021 shall be EUR 68 150 000,00.’;

(3) Article 14a is replaced by the following:

- ‘1. A Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (RACC) shall be established within EUCAP Sahel Mali.
2. The RACC shall include staff co-located with EUCAP Sahel Mali and the Internal Security and Defence Experts (ISDE) located in the Union Delegations to Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The RACC shall gradually relocate staff from Bamako to Nouakchott, in accordance with paragraph 7 and taking into account the security situation.
3. The objectives of the RACC, in close cooperation with Union delegations and with existing CSDP Missions in the Sahel, shall be to:
 - (a) contribute to the Union’s situational awareness of G5 Sahel countries’ security and defence needs and gaps which pertain to regional cross-border cooperation and which deal with security challenges;
 - (b) support the G5 Sahel structures and countries to enhance regional cooperation and operational capabilities in the field of defence and security, in compliance with international law, human rights and the EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security set out by the Council in its conclusions of 10 December 2018;
 - (c) facilitate the organisation of training, the provision of advice and other specific support by Union CSDP Missions in the Sahel for G5 Sahel countries, in particular the organisation of training courses for those countries’ security and defence trainees.
4. The ISDE shall collect information related to security and defence matters in their host countries. They shall provide such information and, where appropriate, make recommendations to the Head of the RACC. They shall keep the Head of the Union Delegation in the place where they are located duly informed.
5. The Civilian Operation Commander shall exercise strategic command and control of the RACC, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and overall authority of the HR. By derogation from Article 6(1), the Head of the RACC shall be directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander and shall act in accordance with the instructions given by him. The Head of the RACC shall issue instructions to all RACC staff.
6. The Head of Mission shall exercise authority over RACC staff in application of Article 6(2) to (4) and Article 11, without prejudice to paragraph 7 of this Article.
7. EUCAP Sahel Mali shall enter into the necessary administrative arrangements with the Union Delegations to Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger on the support to be provided to its staff.

Those administrative arrangements shall, in particular:

- (a) ensure that the logistical and security support necessary for staff members of EUCAP Sahel Mali, in particular the RACC, to accomplish their tasks is provided to them;
- (b) provide that Heads of Delegation have authority over staff members of EUCAP Sahel Mali, in particular the RACC, in their respective Union Delegations, in particular for the purposes of fulfilling their duty of care, ensuring compliance with applicable security requirements and contributing to the exercise of disciplinary control, and are kept duly informed by such staff members of their activities.
- (c) provide that Heads of Delegation are to ensure that the staff members of EUCAP Sahel Mali, in particular the RACC, where they are located in a Union Delegation, enjoy the same privileges and immunities as granted to the staff in that Union Delegation.’.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 13 May 2019.

For the Council
The President
F. MOGHERINI

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2019/763
of 13 May 2019
implementing Decision 2013/798/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Central African Republic

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2013/798/CFSP of 23 December 2013 concerning restrictive measures against the Central African Republic ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 2c thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 23 December 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/798/CFSP.
- (2) On 18 April 2019, the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) updated the information relating to one person subject to restrictive measures.
- (3) The Annex to Decision 2013/798/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision 2013/798/CFSP is hereby amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 13 May 2019.

For the Council
The President
F. MOGHERINI

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 51.

ANNEX

In Decision 2013/798/CFSP, the Annex, Part A (Persons), the entry for the person listed below is replaced by the following entry:

- ‘12. **Abdoulaye HISSÈNE** (*alias*: a) **Abdoulaye Issène**; b) **Abdoulaye Hissein**; c) **Hissene Abdoulaye**; d) **Abdoulaye Issène Ramadan**; e) **Abdoulaye Issene Ramadan**; f) **Issene Abdoulaye**)

Date of birth: a) 1967; b) 1 Jan. 1967

Place of birth: a) Ndele, Bamingui-Bangoran, Central African Republic; b) Haraze Mangueigne, Chad

Nationality: a) Central African Republic; b) Chad

Passport No: CAR diplomatic passport No D00000897, issued on 5 April 2013 (valid until 4 April 2018)

National identification no: Chad national identity card no. 103-00653129-22, issued on 21 April 2009 (expires on 21 April 2019)

Address: a) KM5, Bangui, Central African Republic; b) Nana-Grebizi, Central African Republic; c) Ndjari, Ndjamen, Chad

Date of UN designation: 17 May 2017

Other Information: Hissène was formerly the Minister of Youth and Sports as part of the Cabinet for the Central African Republic's former President Michel Djotodia. Prior to that, he was the head of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace, a political party. He also established himself as a leader of armed militias in Bangui, in particular in the “PK5” (3rd district) neighbourhood. Father's name is Abdoulaye. Mother's name is Absita Moussa. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6098910>

Information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee:

Abdoulaye Hissène was listed on 17 May 2017 pursuant to paragraphs 16 and 17(g) of resolution 2339 (2017) as “engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, including acts that threaten or impede the political transition process, or the stabilisation and reconciliation process or that fuel violence;” and “involved in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against UN missions or international security presences, including MINUSCA, the European Union Missions and French operations which support them.”

Additional information:

Abdoulaye Hissène and other members of the ex-Séléka collaborated with anti-balaka spoilers allied with former Central African Republic (CAR) President François Bozizé, including Maxime Mokom, to encourage violent protests and clashes in September 2015 as part of a failed coup attempt to bring down the Government while then-Transitional President Catherine Samba-Panza was attending the 2015 UN General Assembly. Mokom, Hissène, and others were indicted by the CAR government for various criminal offenses, including murder, arson, torture, and looting, stemming from the failed coup.

Since 2015, Hissène had become one of the main leaders of armed militias located in the “PK5” neighbourhood of Bangui which comprised more than 100 men. As such, he prevented the freedom of movement and the return of state authority in the area, including through illegal taxation of transportation and commercial activities. In the second half of 2015, Hissène acted as the representative of the ex-Séléka “Nairobists” in Bangui operating in a rapprochement with anti-balaka fighters under Mokom. Armed men under the control of Haroun Gaye and Hissène participated in the violent events which took place in Bangui between 26 September and 3 October 2015.

Members of Hissène's group are suspected of having been involved in an attack on the 13 December 2015 — the day of the constitutional referendum — on the vehicle of Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane, a leader of the ex-Séléka. Hissène is accused of orchestrating violence in Bangui's KM5 district that killed five, wounded twenty, and prevented residents from voting in the constitutional referendum. Hissène put the elections at risk by creating a cycle of retaliatory attacks between different groups.

On 15 March 2016, Hissène was apprehended by the police at Bangui M'poko airport and transferred to the research and investigation section of the national gendarmerie. His militia subsequently released him, using force, and stole one weapon previously handed over by MINUSCA as part of an exemption request approved by the Committee.

On 19 June 2016, following the arrest of Muslim traders by internal security forces at "PK 12", militias of Gaye and Hissène kidnapped five national policemen in Bangui. On 20 June, MINUSCA attempted to release the policemen. Armed men under the control of Hissène and Gaye exchanged fire with the peacekeepers attempting to release the hostages. As a result, at least six individuals were killed and one peacekeeper was injured.

On 12 August 2016, Hissène took the lead of a 6-vehicle convoy with heavily armed individuals. The convoy, which was fleeing Bangui, was intercepted by MINUSCA south of Sibut. En route to the North, the convoy exchanged fire with internal security forces at several checkpoints. The convoy was eventually stopped by MINUSCA 40 km south of Sibut. After multiple gunfights, MINUSCA captured 11 of the men, but Hissène and several others escaped. Individuals arrested indicated to MINUSCA that Hissène was the leader of the convoy whose objective was to reach Bria and participate in the Assembly of ex-Séléka groups organised by Nourredine Adam.

In August and September 2016, the Panel of Experts travelled twice to Sibut in order to inspect the belongings of the convoy of Hissène, Gaye and Hamit Tidjani, seized by MINUSCA on 13 August. The Panel also inspected the ammunition seized in the house of Hissène on 16 August. Lethal and non-lethal military equipment was recovered in the six vehicles and from the apprehended individuals. On 16 August 2016, the Central Gendarmerie raided the home of Hissène in Bangui. More than 700 weapons were found.

On 4 September 2016, a group of ex-Séléka elements coming from Kaga-Bandoro on six motor-bikes to pick up Hissène and his affiliates opened fire against MINUSCA next to Dékoa. During this incident, one ex-Séléka fighter was killed, and two peacekeepers and one civilian were wounded.'

